Could one deny premise 6? This statement avoids two obvious problems. It is not surprising, therefore, that most great philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of personal identity, or have committed themselves to metaphysical systems that have substantial implications with regards to the problem, and that most religious belief systems give explicit answers to the persistence question. The fission outcomes Y1 and Y2 are both psychologically continuous with X. The task of solving the metaphysical problem of personal identity essentially involves answering the question of how the phenomenon or principle in virtue of which “entities like us” persist through time is to be specified, under the widely but not universally accepted premises that there is such a phenomenon or principle and that it can be specified. Collect a few possible answers and ask yourself whether the resulting being, the freshly created being that is now a candidate for being identical with you before you died, is in fact you. (2003), pp. This means that in the fission case Y1 and Y2 cannot be identical with X because the transitivity of identity is violated: therefore, X dies in the fission case. Since this conclusion violates the transitivity of identity (which states that if an X is identical with a Y, and the Y is identical with a Z, then the X must be identical with the Z), personal identity relations cannot consist in direct memory connections. Fetuses, infants, or human beings in a persistent vegetative state, for example, plainly do not fulfill the criteria envisaged by Locke. 202-29, Unger, Peter (1979), “I Do Not Exist,” in Macdonald ed. Alleged conclusion: all views which postulate psychological continuity as a necessary condition are false. This gives a distinctive sense to the claim that a criterion of personal identity is to be constitutive, not merely evidential: in order for a relation R to be constitutive for personal identity, it must be the case that, necessarily, if some past or future Y stands in an R-relation to X, then X is identical with Y. 13-45 (reprinted in Martin & Barresi eds. Our alleged intuition: X at t1 is identical with Y at t2. The question a criterion of personal identity answers is: what kind of changes does a person survive? WR-INI may entail IM but does not so necessarily: it is conceivable that personal identity relations consist in something which is itself neither identical with nor reducible to a spiritual substance nor identical with nor reducible to aggregates or parts of psychologies and physiologies. We could avoid this problem by adding a closest-continuer or best candidate clause, stating roughly that the best candidate for survival in a fission scenario, that is, the fission outcome which bears the most or the most important resemblances to the original person X, is identical with X. The problem is that human beings are organic material objects, the persistence of which is determined by these objects’ following a continuous trajectory between space-time points. also 2.d.). Our alleged intuition: since both Y1 and Y2 share with X all psychological characteristics, both are candidates for being identical with X: either, in the absence of the other, would have been identical with X. …a physiological criterion of personal identity is false. 19-26, Parfit, Derek A. So folgt die rechtliche I… Psychological continuity relations are to be understood in terms of overlapping chains of direct psychological connections, that is, those causal and cognitive connections between beliefs, desires, intentions, experiential memories, character traits and so forth. Parfit 1984). Does the logic of the concept of identity impose further restraints on the concept of personal identity? Identity Mysticism plays only an indirect role in contemporary personal identity theory. B: from 2, A: Psychological continuity is necessary and/or sufficient for our persistence. A criterion is a set of non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions that determines, insofar as that is possible, whether distinct temporally indexed person-stages are stages of one and the same continuant person. No, precisely because the brain criterion is true for human beings, a liver criterion would have to be true for members of this tribe. For example, on this view, it appears to be possible for two future persons to be psychologically continuous with a presently existing person. 230-50, Merricks, Trenton (1998), “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,”, Nagel, Thomas (1971), “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,”, Noonan, Harold (1993), “Constitution Is Identity,”, Olson, Eric T. (1997b), “Relativism and Persistence,”, Parfit, Derek A. Consequently, unless one holds that personal identity is categorically indeterminate whenever the physiological and psychological features of a human being come apart, appeal to indeterminacy cannot establish the rejection of the Big Assumption in such a way as to avoid the Paradox’s conclusion. How does one’s identity develop over time? One of the main problems a psychological approach faces is overcoming an alleged circularity associated with explicating personal identity relations in terms of psychological notions. It is hard to believe, however, because it entails that I can kill you without you ever noticing: if I knock you unconscious, transplant one of your brain hemispheres into a different body, and drop you off at home before you wake up, then, if the transplant is successful and the psychological approach with non-branching proviso is true, you are dead. (1991), pp. While a weakly reductive criterion of personal identity relations is explicable in terms of the identities of phenomena other than persons, the identities of these phenomena themselves are not explicable in other terms: their identity may be, as we would suppose “soul identity” to be, “strict and philosophical”, and not merely “loose and popular” (Butler 1736). soziale Identität, Theorie der Sozialen Identität (SIT = Social Identity Theory), ist innerhalb der kognitiv orientierten Sozialpsychologie die bei weitem prominenteste Theorie der Intergruppenbeziehungen (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). The Narrow version, we may note, is logically equivalent to the Physical Criterion. Beim Menschen bezeichnet Identität (v. lat. We must distinguish between two versions of this view. Evans 1985; Wiggins 2001). Theoretischer Bezugsrahmen 4.1 Begriff der Identität 4.1.1 Was ist Identität(sarbeit), Wozu Identität? [Note: ∀(x, y) is an abbreviation of (∀x)(∀y).]. These commentators typically complement their psychological theory with a non-branching proviso and/or a closest continuer clause. While many commentators regard the appeal to quasi-memory, and ultimately “quasi-psychology,” as sufficient to solve the circularity problem, some commentators think that personal concepts infiltrate extensionally articulated psychological concept-systems so deeply that any reductionist programme in personal identity is doomed from the start (cf. Consequently, the question does in fact have an answer, and the claim that identity is indeterminate is self-contradictory. One makes a judgment of personal identity whenever one says that a person existing at one time is the same as a person existing at another time: e.g., that the president of Das Thema ist Identität. 2. identity - the individual characteristics by which a thing or person is recognized or known; "geneticists only recently discovered the identity of the gene that causes it"; "it was too dark to determine his identity"; "she guessed the identity of his lover". 1 a : the distinguishing character or personality of an individual : individuality. This contention may contradict our intuitions more than any thought experiment could. 4.1.2 Teilidentitäten und multiple Identitäten 4.1.3 Das Identitätsgefühl Their truth is, literally, a matter of life and death. To make things clearer, consider the case of Teletransportation above: if at t2 Y on Mars remembers having had at t1 X’s experience on earth that the coffee is too hot, then, necessarily, X at t1 is identical with Y at t2. 45-59, Johnston, Mark (1992), “Constitution Is Not Identity,”, Johnston, Mark (1997), “Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves,” in Dancy ed. Lewis 1976; Noonan 1989; Perry 1972). persönlich, Persönlichkeit, Personalchef, Personalie. Let the underlying assumption be that there is a criterion of personal identity. Da die persönliche Identität vor allem eine kognitive Leistung der Begriffsbildung ist, spricht man neuerdings auch vom Selbstkonzept. The system of claim 1 wherein the vehicle data further includes identification codes and priority codes. Although the lump of bronze and the statue itself surely exist, these objects have different persistence conditions: if melted down, Venus ceases to exist while the lump of bronze does not. Authors: Christian Neuhäuser. Diesen Satz verwendeten Wissenschaftler bereits im 17. Premise 5: The distinction between IM and WR–INI on the one hand and the reductionist views sketched in I.A.4 on the other is exclusive. (1997), pp. Wie beeinflüssen Sprache und Kultur die Identit ä t?Wie beitragen individuelle Menschen zu … Zimmerman 1998): IM: X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 iff X at t1 is identical to Y at t2. Alleged conclusion: either, on pain of violating the transitivity of identity, the Psychological Criterion is false or the question of whether two person-stages X at t1 and Y1 at t2 are temporal parts of the same person depends on facts concerning not only X and Y1 but also, in this case, Y2. Since it is determinate that X is identical with X, under the assumption that congruence and predicate logic apply, X must be determinately identical with Y. : Die persönliche Identität, während immaterielle, ist wichtig. From this it follows that. In that case the kid is identical with the primary school teacher and the primary school teacher is identical with the old man; the old man, however, is not identical with the kid. Im deutschen Sprachraum taucht „Kulturelle Identität“ häufiger auf als „Soziale Identität“ mit rund 100.000 („Social Identity“: 870.000), „Kollektive Identität“ mit 30.000 („Collective Identity“: 85.000) und „Nationale Identität“ mit gut 250.000 Treffern („National Identity“: 2.700.000). a. an equation that is valid for all values of its variables, as in ( x – y ) ( x + y) = x2 – y2. One should refrain from drawing precipitate conclusions from its defining characteristic as a paradox, that is, the fact that denying any of its premises leads to a conclusion that either violates our intuitions or, in the case of 4, 5, and C, commits one to a philosophically disreputable stance. Since a fetus does not possess the cognitive capacities necessary to satisfy the demands of the Psychological Criterion, if the latter is true, no person can be identical with a past fetus. Der Aufbau von Identität findet in der Zeit und im Hinblick auf ein zukünftiges Leben statt. These adventures do not have to be theoretically as fancy as the cases, to be discussed later, of human fission or brain swaps: a theory of personal identity tells us whether we can live through the acquisition of complex cognitive capacities in … The question of whether or not physically impossible but logically possible scenarios are acceptable remains to be answered. …a psychological criterion of personal identity is false. The argument is simple: Premise 1: Psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the persistence of a human animal. The same is true of persons, who are constituted by, but not identical with, a physiology, a psychology, and the occurrence of an interrelated series of causal and cognitive relations. Parfit 1984). Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 4(3): Art. Furthermore, theories of personal identity have ethical and metaphysical implications of considerable magnitude: in conjunction with certain normative premises they may support the justification or condemnation of infanticide or euthanasia, or they could prove or falsify certain aspects of our religious outlook, in deciding the questions of how and whether we can be resurrected and whether we are possessors of souls whose existence conditions are identical with ours. „persönliche Identität“ (individual identification): Bestimmung durch einzigartige Kombination von Eigenschaften ... und diese Definition muß ausgedrückt, und dieser Ausdruck muß auch im Angesicht zahlreicher potentieller Störungen durchgehalten werden." Combined with a four-dimensionalist or temporal part ontology, this view is not as absurd as it initially seems, but it is certainly controversial. However, given that the paradox obliges us, in one way or other, to revise our pre-philosophical beliefs, a theory of personal identity should aim at meeting what will be referred to as the Adequacy Constraint AC on theories of personal identity, which demands that. Persönliche Identität = Ich-Modus / hohe persönliche Identität; Soziale Identität = Wir-Modus / hohe soziale Identität; Identität eines Menschen bewegt sich auf einem Konitnuum, das von einem Extrem einer rein persönlichen Identität bis zu einem anderen Extrem einer rein sozialen Identität reicht. Request full-text PDF. Suppose X’s brain to be transplanted into Y’s skull and X’s body and Y’s brain are destroyed. Wer bin ich? Wird ein Mensch geboren, hat er bereits eine eigene Identität, ohne es jedoch zu wissen und ausleben zu können. Conclusion: The physiological approach is true. Translator. We would wish to say that since X and Y share all psychological features, it is reasonable or intuitive to judge that X and Y are identical, and precisely not that since we describe the case as one in which there is a continuity between X’s and Y’s psychologies, X and Y are necessarily identical. In this case, it does not seem to be the case that the surgeons transplant the human animal X from one head to another. In order to discover what your pre-philosophical attitude towards this question is, ask yourself the following: what does a supernatural being have to do in order to resurrect you after you die? Parfit 1984). A third problem for the psychological approach is that it implies, supposedly, that we are not human animals (Ayers 1990; Snowdon 1990; Olson 1997a; 2002a). (A property may be called “non-relational” if its being borne by a substance is independent of the relations in which property or substance stand to other properties or substances.) Parfit 1984). Einheit 5- persönliche identität 5.1 I can talk about how personality and character define us. Ich-Identität - eine Definition Die Psychologie ist nicht nur eine interessante Wissenschaft, sie ist mindestens … Das Kollektivverhalten steht für eine unstrukturierte Reaktions- oder Verhaltensweise in einem Kollektiv, die zwar nicht zufällig, aber auch nicht durch soziale Interaktion innerhalb des … (1971b), On “The Importance of Self-Identity”,”, Parfit, Derek A. 3.a. The defender of the physiological approach now argues that. NEWSCHOOL New School, die Sendung von Kindern für Kinder, ist diesmal an der Grundschule am Wilhelmsberg. Translate texts with the world's best machine translation technology, developed by the creators of Linguee. Persönliche und öffentliche Identität Wie dr ückt man Identit ä t aus? Personal identity theorists, therefore, ought to offer a more comprehensive account of the ontological status of persons and their relation to the constituents that make them up. Nowadays, the Simple View is disparaged as a theory only maintained by thinkers whose religious or spiritual commitments outweigh the reasons that speak against their views on personal identity. If these notions are understood similarly, the views are (close to) equivalent; the other extreme, even if unlikely to be held, is that the notions are understood differently, to the effect that they are incompatible (if, for example, a functioning human body and its life-sustaining organs could come apart). Alleged conclusion: personal identity is indeterminate. What does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist in? Such a criterion specifies, insofar as that is possible, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the survival of persons. ); (iii) that what prudentially matters in survival is psychological continuity; (iv) that personal identity relations must respect the remaining formal properties of identity. Personal identity is an instance of the relation of numerical identity; investigations into the nature of the former, therefore, must respect the formal properties that govern the latter. Selbstdefinition als einzigartiges und unverwechselbares Individuum, die auf einer interpersonalen (oder intragruppalen) Differenzierung auf der Basis individueller Merkmale beruht („ich“ vs. „du“ oder „ihr“) sozialen Identität However, since these thought experiments deliver conflicting intuitions about which criterion is true, it cannot be the case that more than one such criterion is true. Behrendt 2003; Cassam 1989; 1992; Johnston 1997; McDowell 1997; Parfit 1984; 1999; forthcoming; cf. The problem of cashing out this conviction in theoretical terms, however, is notoriously difficult. A: for reductio:The psychological approach is true. To be sure, these initially baffling claims could be true. the state or fact of being the same one as described. United Kingdom, Understanding the Problem of Personal Identity, Reductionism (2): Psychological Approaches, Reductionism (3): Physiological Approaches, Parfit and the Unimportance of Personal Identity. Look up in Linguee; Suggest as a translation of "persönliche Angaben" ... man garantiert die größtmögliche Zurückhaltung und die persönliche Identität. Die Adoleszenz beginnt mit dem Einsetzen der Pubertät (biologisch-geschlechtliche Reifung) und endet mit dem Eintritt in eine erwachsene Lebenssituation (berufliche Selbständigkeit, Loslösung von der Herkunftsfamilie). How is the Paradox to be resolved? Consequently, to specify such a criterion is to give an account of what personal identity necessarily consists in. The aim of this article is to (1) add precision to the problem of personal identity, (2) state a number of theories of personal identity and give arguments for and against them, (3) formulate “the paradox of identity,” which proposes to show that posing the persistence question, in conjunction with a number of plausible assumptions, leads to a contradiction, and (4) explain how Derek Parfit’s theory of persons attempts to answer this paradox. Our alleged intuition: towards the near end of the spectrum X at t1 is identical with Y at t2 and towards the far end of the spectrum X at t1 is not identical with Y at t2. Consider the following thought experiment: X’s brain is transplanted into Y’s body. Another intuitively appealing view, championed by John Locke, holds that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. The underlying problem, however, is that it seems undeniable that there is a human animal located where each of us is. Chisholm 1976; Lowe 1996; Merricks 1998; Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984). Einleitung 3. Arguably, many respectable philosophical ideologies, such as conceptualism or Neo-Kantianism, may issue in theories of personal identity along Simple lines without appeal to Cartesian Egos. D: from B, 6A: Neither physiological nor psychological continuity is both necessary and sufficient for personal identity. According to this general stance, either both psychological and physiological continuity relations are fully reducible to a domain in which physical explanations are couched, perhaps in terms of the basic elements of a final and unified theory of physics, or they belong themselves to such a domain.
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